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In most Western countries liability for adverse events in healthcare is considered by 
the courts within a tort-based adversarial system. In New Zealand personal injuries 
caused by medical treatment are covered under a no-fault accident compensation 
statute. This legal regime represents society-wide liability for personal injuries caused 
by accident. The no-fault statute is universally considered as a unique and successful 
alternative to tort law. However, the scheme is not ideal and is subjected to criticism 
in several respects. The most common point of criticism is that under this system 
resources are allocated on the basis of injury causation rather than on incapacitated 
persons’ needs. That results in people with similar disabilities getting disparate levels 
of assistance from the state. Furthermore, the fairness of imposing a statutory bar on 
litigation in exchange for the universal access to cover and entitlements is also 
questioned. 
 
The goal of this research is to explore whether this legal regime is ethically sound. 
Using ethical analysis as a research methodology this dissertation examines the 
fundamental ethical principles underpinning the goals and objectives of the accident 
compensation statute, focussing on its treatment injury provisions. It identifies 
distributive justice, beneficence and non-maleficence as the key ethical premises in 
the foundation of the scheme, and the competing interests between social utility of the 
scheme and distributive justice as the key ethical tension. To answer the research 
question, this dissertation examines fairness of distribution based on cause of injury, 
and fairness of the terms of cooperation that relinquished civil litigation for 
compensation in exchange for the social insurance model. 
 
This paper argues that moral intuition alone is insufficient for making decisions on 
morality of rules and institutions, and appeals to two most prominent moral theories 
of distributive justice, utilitarianism and egalitarianism, for guidance in the ethical 
evaluation of the treatment injury legislation.  The discourse asserts that the no-fault 
regime has maximised social utility of redress for adverse events in healthcare, and 
advanced justice. While not ideal by the virtue of being the product of the non-ideal 
world with its political and economic pressures, the legislation seems to be ethically 
robust from the perspectives of both theories as it has achieved ‘a proper balance 
between competing claims’ (Rawls 1971, p.5) and is to everybody’s rational 
advantage.  The conclusion articulates that the no-fault statute represents a reasonable 
balance of utilitarian interests and egalitarian concerns, and a reflection of the moral 
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Researching for this paper was a great intellectual pleasure but articulating and 
debating the issues turned into a very challenging exercise. A number of factors 
contributed to this challenge.  First, this dissertation attempts to look at the treatment 
injury legislation from a unique perspective that is rich in potential scope but 
undeveloped, with many of its aspects warranting more in-depth academic research. 
Second, applying a bioethical framework to the evaluation of a legal regime has its 
problems. Third, the ethical issues are closely related to and influenced by other 
disciplines, such as legal studies, political and legal philosophy, public health and 
economics.  Maintaining focus on the ethical aspects, while acknowledging other 
disciplines but not deviating from the intended course was another challenge.  Lastly, 
the debates around this piece of legislation are permeated with conflicting opinions 
and a paucity of empirical evidence supporting either side of the argument.  Overall, I 
am afraid this paper does not do justice to this fascinating subject, and hope that the 
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Laws vary from one society to another, morality does not. 
(Honore, 1993, p1)
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In most Western countries liability for adverse healthcare events1 is considered by the 
courts within a tort-based adversarial system. In New Zealand medical liability is 
covered under the treatment injury sections of the accident compensation statute. In 
essence, this legislation signifies that the state provides comprehensive cover to 
individuals for personal injuries caused by medical treatment.  In exchange, litigation 
through the courts for compensatory damages arising from any covered injury is 
barred. This legislation is unique and well integrated into the no-fault accident 
compensation scheme currently governed by the Accident Compensation Act 20012.  
 
At its early stages, the no-fault system was seen as possibly ‘the most effective 
remedies for the ills of … tort reparation system’ (Bernstein 1973), and ‘a requiem for 
the common law’ (Palmer 1973, p.1).  The scheme has evolved over the years; 
however, its key founding principles of social responsibility and comprehensive 
entitlements have remained constant.  Three decades later the scheme is regarded as 
‘unquestionably an enduring success’ that ‘avoids the economic and social injustices 
that the common law inflicts upon injured persons’ (Johnston 2007, p.295), and a 
legal reform that assumed ‘Messianic tendencies’ (Palmer 2004, p.906).   
 
Over time the legislative provisions related to adverse events in healthcare have been 
refined and transformed.  The latest and probably the most remarkable changes were 
enacted in the Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Compensation Amendment (No 
2) Act 2005. This Act considerably extended the scope of cover for medical injuries. 
It introduced a new concept of treatment injury, set out the cover criteria, and repealed 
the previous legislative requirement to prove fault on the part of health professionals.  
While the overall satisfaction with the latest change in the statute is high (Dowden et 
al. 2009, Stewart 2010), several significant concerns about the scheme remain 
unresolved. 
                                                 
1 The term ‘adverse events’ is used in this dissertation as an all-inclusive terminological umbrella for 
harm and untoward events occurring in the context of medical care.  
2 The title of the accident compensation statute has been changed several times since its original name 
the ‘Accident Compensation Act 1972’. It has currently returned to its initial name and referred to as 
the ‘Accident Compensation Act 2001’.  For convenience, from hereon in the text I refer to the 
accident compensation legislation as the AC Act, regardless of its full title. 
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First, exclusion of illness and disease from the scheme continues to produce tensions 
as it is seen as leading to significant inequities.  Cover and associated entitlements are 
linked to the cause of disability and not to the individual’s needs. It is particularly 
disquieting in cases of perinatal injuries, when a cause of often life-limiting 
pathology, such as hypoxic brain injury, can be problematic to establish because of 
scientific uncertainty. In these cases children with similar needs end up getting 
disparate levels of support from the state. 
 
Second, fairness of the statutory bar on litigation for personal injuries and the 
adequacy of compensation for harm caused by treatment are questioned. In monetary 
terms, tort jurisdictions provide higher recompense, particularly in cases of non-
earners who cannot claim earnings-related entitlements (Bismark and Paterson 2006, 
Duffy et al. 2001). 
 
Finally, it is questioned whether the no-fault approach could compromise quality of 
medical care through lack of financial incentives for clinicians to improve the 
standard of care and reduce numbers of iatrogenic injuries. The opponents of the no-
fault approach claim that a tort-based system is better suited to serve the social 
purpose of improving quality of healthcare through penalising clinicians for 
substandard services (Howell 2004, Studdert et al. 2011). 
 
This dissertation is an attempt to analyse these concerns from the ethics perspective. 
The structure of the dissertation  
 
The dissertation consists of four interrelated parts. The introductory chapter gives a 
brief overview of injuries covered under the treatment injury regime, and as a way of 
illustration provides several scenarios commonly considered under the treatment 
injury legislation. It describes ethical analysis as a research methodology and outlines 
the research design, its goal, objectives and method. 
 
The first chapter provides background to the origins of the accident compensation 
regime and a synopsis of the treatment injury legislation’s conception and evolution. 
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It refers to the relevant sections of the AC Act, and emphasises that the treatment 
injury legislation does not exist in a legislative vacuum. The chapter alludes to several 
other statutes that can complement the AC Act or address some of the concerns 
brought about by adverse events in healthcare.  
 
The second chapter is concerned with the ethical premises underlying the treatment 
injury legislation. First it outlines the founding principles of the AC Act, such as the 
intent to provide equitable access to remedies for personal injury and to reduce 
healthcare-related harm to society. Then it examines the core ethical premises 
underlying these principles, and identifies justice and fairness, beneficence and non-
maleficence as the relevant ethical premises.  The chapter elaborates on the concepts 
of justice and fairness, and considers justice for individuals who experienced adverse 
events in healthcare, efficiency as prerequisite for justice, and raises the issue of 
inequity in distribution of benefits. The chapter examines the concepts of beneficence 
and non-maleficence that underline the commitment to enhanced patient safety and 
healthcare-related harm reduction. It discusses the effects of the no-fault system-
oriented approach on reduction of incidence of medical injuries.  In conclusion the 
chapter identifies the competing interests between social utility of the scheme and 
distributive justice as the ethical tension that warrants further discussion.   
 
The final chapter outlines two major philosophical theories of distributive justice 
deployed in ethical analysis: utilitarianism and egalitarianism, with Rawls’ justice as 
fairness as its most prominent theory.  These theories were selected for analysis 
because they both provide powerful analytical tools and represent two most influential 
philosophical schools distinct in their views on justice and utility.  The chapter 
examines the key ethical tension between social utility of the scheme and distributive 
justice through the prism of the utilitarian theory and egalitarian framework, in 
particular the Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness.  
 
The conclusion sums up the arguments, reflects on the application of the critical 
analysis, and considers whether there is a better alternative to the current scheme for 
redressing medical injuries. 
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Treatment injuries profile 
 
Under the no-fault treatment injury legislation the accident compensation scheme 
covers a wide range of physical injuries caused by medical treatment. The most 
commonly covered injuries are generally high volume, low cost, such as allergic 
reactions to medications, wound infections following surgical interventions, 
haematomas secondary to intravenous cannulation, dental injuries during anaesthetic 
intubation, skin damage attributed to inadequate nursing care, and others (Tapp and 
Frew 2011). 
 
In a majority of cases cover decisions can be relatively straightforward. However a 
considerable proportion of claims is categorised as complex, and a person’s 
underlying pathology could be a significant precursor and contributor to the adverse 
outcome. As the legislation excludes ‘personal injury that is wholly or substantially 
caused by a person’s underlying health condition’ (AC Act 2001, section 32(2)(a)), 
claims for delayed diagnosis are particularly challenging. Furthermore, unlike in cases 
of personal injuries caused by accident, it is more difficult to determine when medical 
acts or their omissions caused a problem, and define a specific medical problem 
attributable to the acts or omissions. 
 
To illustrate some points in the subsequent discussion, it is helpful to describe 
common scenarios that are routinely considered within the scope of the treatment 
injury legislation.  In cases of diagnostic-related claims the challenging questions are 
what could have been done and whether it would have made a difference to the 
underlying disease. Juxtaposition of these cases informs the discourse on benefit 
distribution that is based on injury causation and not on need.  
 
Case study 1 – Delay in diagnosing subarachnoid haemorrhage (SAH)  
 
Shane suddenly developed a headache and neck pain while lifting a heavy object. The 
next day his GP diagnosed a neck sprain. As the pain did not improve, Shane 
repeatedly went back to see his GP but was advised to keep taking painkillers for his 
neck injury. Several days after the initial consultation Shane collapsed at home and 
was admitted to hospital. Investigations revealed extensive subarachnoid haemorrhage 
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as a result of a ruptured cerebral artery aneurysm. Shane suffered significant 
impairment due to the brain haemorrhage. Shane’s treatment injury claim was covered 
by ACC on the basis that earlier diagnosis and treatment of the ruptured aneurysm 
would have resulted in a less severe brain damage, and that Shane’s presentation to 
his GP warranted further investigations.  
 
Case study 2 – Delay in diagnosing subarachnoid haemorrhage3 
 
John presented to his GP complaining of neck pain and headaches. The GP diagnosed 
neck strain and prescribed Voltaren. Three days after the consultation John collapsed 
at home and was taken to hospital. At admission John was diagnosed with SAH and 
underwent emergency clipping of the ruptured brain aneurysm, and sustained 
significant neurological deficit following the surgery. A claim was lodged for failure 
by the GP to diagnose SAH. The claim was declined because it was determined that at 
the point of the GP consultation John did not display any symptoms or signs that 
would have warranted further investigations, and had John been sent to hospital, he 
was likely to have been sent home because of non-specific and non-alarming nature of 
his complaints. John’s neurological impairment was attributed to the underlying 
medical condition (ruptured brain aneurysm) and not to medical treatment. 
 
Case study 3 – Delay in diagnosing breast cancer 
 
Susan visited her GP complaining of experiencing pain in the left breast for around 
two months. The GP detected no abnormalities on clinical examination and advised 
Susan to attend a planned screening mammography. The mammogram results were 
reported as normal and no follow up was arranged. Nine months later Susan returned 
to the GP with more complains. Further investigations detected advanced breast 
carcinoma, and Susan required extensive treatment. The claim was accepted because 
it was established that earlier diagnosis of breast cancer would have resulted in less 
aggressive treatment, and screening mammography was not an appropriate choice of 
diagnostic pathway in this case. 
 
                                                 
3 The cases 1 and 3 are based on the treatment injury case studies, the cases 2 and 4 are fictional and 
reflect common scenarios  
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Case study 4 – Delay in diagnosing kidney cancer 
 
Mary consulted her GP complaining of pain and frequent urination. An ultrasound 
scan detected multiple cysts in the left kidney. These cysts were rendered benign and 
no follow up was arranged. Several years later Mary complained of abdominal pain 
and weight loss. Repeat ultrasound detected malignant carcinoma in the left kidney. 
The carcinoma metastasised into other organs. Mary required extensive treatment and 
her prognosis was poor. Mary’s family lodged the claim for a failure to diagnose renal 
carcinoma at the initial consultation. The claim was declined because it was 
determined that the benign lesions on the initial ultrasound had no relation to the 
malignancy, and that Mary’s ill health was caused by the underlying cancer and not 
by the allegedly delayed diagnosis.  
 
Comparing Shane’s and John’s situations with those of Susan’s and Mary’s, it is 
evident that the needs of these people could be very similar. However, compensation 
and rehabilitation they will be receiving would differ.  The overall benefits Shane and 
Susan receive through the accident compensation scheme could be substantially 
greater then John’s and Mary’s. John and Mary do not get entitlements because their 
ill-health was due to natural progression of the underlying medical conditions.  
 
In the subsequent chapters I use these case studies to examine the ethical 
underpinnings of the cover provisions and to illustrate the discussion on a) whether 
Shane and Susan get satisfactory redress for their treatment injuries; b) whether it is 
fair that John and Mary may end up worse off than Shane and Susan. 
 
Ethical analysis as a research methodology 
 
Much has been written about the history of this piece of legislation and how 
compensation for adverse medical events became part of the scheme (Butler 2004, 
Coates 2005, Easton 2004, Oliphant 2007).  However no critical analysis of the 
ethical premises underpinning its founding principles has ever been undertaken. 
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Apart from the natural curiosity to inquire into new and uncharted territories, it is a 
worthwhile topic for exploration. How do we assess whether law is ethically sound? 
A direct appeal to moral intuition is insufficient for making a considered moral 
judgment.  Our capacity to assess justice and recognise injustice is conditioned by our 
subjective perceptions and judgements. To test intuition, applied ethics deploy a 
variety of methods of systematic evaluations of goodness of rules, practices and 
institutions. Critical analysis made on moral grounds helps with exposing law’s 
weaknesses and correct injustice, if it exists.  As Honore submits, ‘[i]t is true that 
morality is in important respects separate from law. But the separateness consists in 
the critical role of moral thinking, in the fact that all laws are subject to moral 
criticism.’ (Honore 1993, p.17)  
 
Evaluation of legal rules can be carried out either though a methodical examination of 
the implications of these rules for particular cases or through general application of a 
theory of justice.  Ethical analysis is defined as a systematic application of moral 
reasoning, or considered moral judgement.  The overall purpose of ethical analysis is 
to reach conclusion on whether the object of scrutiny is moral and ethically sound.  To 
use Rawls’s definition, the practical application of ethical analysis is ‘to focus on 
deeply disputed questions and to see whether, despite appearances, some underlying 
basis of philosophical and moral agreement can be uncovered’ (Rawls 2001, p2).  
 
To achieve this purpose, the first step is to ascertain the facts of the case and the 
ethical premises underpinning the facts. The next step is to highlight the key 
competing interests and tensions.  Finally, through presenting and arguing conflicting 
positions and applying relevant philosophical theories the analysis is set to achieve its 
purpose objectively, without imposing the writer’s personal values on the issue in 
question.  
 
This analytical framework can be applied to ethical reasoning on individual cases, 
particular situations, institutions, legislation and such alike. The law is a social force 
and as such it overlaps with morality, with the expectation that any legislation must be 
designed to bring about fair and just results. However, Mill acknowledges that a law 
is not ‘the ultimate criterion of justice’, and that there may be unjust law that benefits 
some people over others (Mill 1991, p.218). Furthermore, although fairness and 
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justice are essential in assessing ethical robustness, these concepts represent only one 
facet of overall morality. It is not uncommon when in complex situations and cases 
the quest for justice and fairness competes with other ethical claims. Ethics in law 
involve a complex interplay between guarding justice to the individual, protecting 
common good and ensuring a fair distribution of resources. 
 
The goal of this research is to scrutinise the ethical foundation of the treatment injury 
legislation through the prism of two major philosophical theories so as to evaluate 
whether this regime is ethically sound.   
 
Hence, the first step in this analysis is to define the core ethical premises underlying 
the founding principles of the treatment injury legislation, then to identify and test the 
key ethical tension by deploying the theories of justice, and finally to make 
conclusions on ethical robustness of the legislation. 
Research method 
 
To provide a structure for moral deliberations on justice, Rawls advanced a method of 
reflective equilibrium, grounded in inductive logic (Rawls 1971). A reflective 
equilibrium can be summarised as a process of reflecting and revising one’s beliefs 
and intuitions through a systematic application of moral perspectives (Daniels 2011).  
 
Rawls’ reflective equilibrium framework integrates two approaches: narrow and wide. 
A narrow reflective equilibrium analysis focuses on particular cases or groups, and 
applies one moral perspective, without challenging its view by alternative moral 
theories.  Hence narrow reflective equilibrium is limited in its capacity to answer the 
questions on what is morally right, and it does not help with resolving disagreements 
if they arise.  Under a wide reflective equilibrium framework the principles are tested 
against well established moral theories, so as to juxtapose and explore competing 
principles, and arrive at a conclusion on morality of the principles.  
 
Within an analytical framework similar to Rawls’, Sen suggests two approaches to 
examining moral dilemmas. First, a ‘case-implication critique’ considers ethical 
tension through checking the implications for particular cases when the consequences 
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of these implications can be illustrated. Second, a ‘prior-principle critique’ reasons 
through moral dilemmas by shifting ‘from the general to the more general’, and 
considering the principle under scrutiny in light of another fundamental principle (Sen 
1979).  
 
To answer the research question, I deploy both narrow and wide reflective 
equilibrium methods to explore morality of the treatment injury regime. I test the 
ethical tensions through applying two major philosophical theories of justice: 
utilitarianism and egalitarianism, in particular Rawls’ framework of justice as 
fairness. In essence, utilitarianism is concerned with maximising public good, and 
producing maximal goodness for the greatest number.  The utilitarian approach 
provides a valuable analytical framework for comprehensive assessment of rules and 
policies. Sen asserts that ‘consequentialist reasoning may be fruitfully used even when 
consequentialism as such is not accepted. To ignore consequences is to leave the 
ethics story half told’ (Sen 1987, p.75).   
 
Conversely, egalitarianism, with Rawls as its most prominent theorist, emphasises 
equality and fairness in distribution of public good.  While these theories differ, in 
analysis of the treatment injury legislation they should be combined.  A fairness-based 
analysis independent of the impact of the statute on society and consequences for 
individuals would have provided an incomplete picture. If a legal rule is fair, but its 
negative effects over time eventually produce more harm than benefit, then can it be 
regarded moral? 
 
CHAPTER ONE - BACKGROUND 
 
Knowledge of the history of the statute’s conception and evolution is essential for 
understanding its ethical premises. This history provides a rich context and a good 
illustration of how these premises relate the legislation’s origin.   
 
This chapter first gives a brief overview of the history of the New Zealand statute on 
redressing the consequences of adverse medical events, its conception and 
development.  The chapter’s final section refers to the relevant provisions of the AC 
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Act and its founding principles as set out in the Woodhouse report, and outlines other 
jurisdictions relevant to adverse events in health care.  
Historical overview 
 
The history of development of the treatment injury statutory concept is a fascinating 
chronicle that reflects the changes in the New Zealand political scene over the last 
forty years.  Throughout its existence, cover for medical injury was ‘vulnerable to 
changing ideologies and political interference’ (Manning 2010, p.14). The changes 
were precipitated and influenced by a complex tangle of multiple political and 
economic factors. As Sir Geoffrey Palmer succinctly described it ‘the ultimate issues 
in the New Zealand accident compensation reforms were not about the law. They 
were about values. They concerned social priorities. The choices were political.’ 
(Palmer 2004, p.906) 
 
Several publications provide a detailed history of the evolution of the part of the 
accident compensation regime dealing with the adverse outcomes of medical 
treatment (Butler 2004, Collins 1992, Corkill 2002, Oliphant 2007).  The inception of 
the accident compensation scheme goes back to December 1967, when the Royal 
Commission of Inquiry reported its findings on the inquiry into the worker’s 
compensation scheme.  The inquiry was precipitated by dissatisfaction with the then 
existing means of seeking redress for personal injuries arising out of work- and 
motor-vehicle-related accidents.  The Commission was chaired by a Judge of the 
Supreme Court, Mr Justice Woodhouse. 
 
The Commission’s findings and recommendations were summarised in the Report of 
the Royal Commission of Inquiry4.  While much has been written about the 
Woodhouse Report and its recommendations, they are so fundamental to 
understanding of the subsequent developments that it is impossible to avoid multiple 
references to the Woodhouse Report in any academic writing on this subject. 
 
The Report highlighted the key inadequacies of the existing redresses that were ‘a 
form of lottery’, leaving a majority of citizens ‘to fend for themselves’ (Woodhouse 
                                                 
4 Commonly referred to as the Woodhouse Report 
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1967, p.19).  In essence, the Report recommended a fundamental law reform, 
replacing the common law action for damages with no-fault statutory compensation.  
 
The Report emphasised three fundamental foci for addressing injuries arising from 
accidents: prevention, rehabilitation and compensation, and stressed the priority of the 
first two foci over compensation: ‘The most important is obviously prevention. Next 
in importance is the obligation to rehabilitate the injured. Thirdly, there is the duty to 
compensate them for their losses. …’ (Woodhouse 1967, p.19). 
 
The recommendations set up five founding principles of the accident compensation 
regime: 
 Community responsibility 
 Comprehensive entitlements  
 Complete rehabilitation 
 Real compensation 
 Administrative efficiency (Woodhouse 1967, p.20) 
 
The first two principles were defined as ‘fundamental’, and the subsequent three 
‘rules’ were supplementary and pragmatic, so to make the scheme affordable to the 
nation (Woodhouse, 1967, p.20).  
 
These fundamental principles are stated as: 
 
First, no satisfactory system of injury insurance can be organised except 
on a basis of community responsibility; 
 
Second, wisdom, logic, and justice all require that every citizen who is 
injured must be included, and equal losses must be given equal treatment5. 
There must be comprehensive entitlement.  
                                                                           (Woodhouse 1967, p.20) 
                                                 
5 It is worthwhile to note that the meaning of the words ‘treatment’ and ‘treat’ in this dissertation 
depends on the context of their use. When used in a medical context their meaning is clinical care. In 
the legal and ethics contexts, their meaning is ‘application’, ‘dealing with’, and ‘consideration’. 
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In the subsequent chapter these principles and the ethical premises underlying these 
principles are discussed in more detail. 
 
It is important to note that the medical injury compensation regime was initiated by 
the Woodhouse Report that suggested including medical injuries in the scope of cover 
for accidental injuries.  The Commission’s recommendations on inclusion of 
iatrogenic injuries were generic and cautious:  
 
289 (c) We recommend that, in general, protection should be afforded in 
respect of injury conditions which fall within the categories of external 
cause of injury… perhaps some categories of therapeutic misadventure or 
late complications of therapeutic procedures…. 
                                                                            (Woodhouse 1967, p.113) 
 
The selection of injuries to be covered under the accident compensation scheme was 
based on the classification of external causes of injuries coding system. It did not arise 
from concerns about medical malpractice (Bismark and Paterson 2006, Butler 2004), 
and its purpose was to compensate the injured and not to punish the injurer.  Before 
the AC Act was introduced, for the period from 1881 to 1972, only seven court 
decisions on medical negligence were reported (Butler 2004). It was in contrast to the 
medical malpractice crisis in the United States that markedly escalated in the 1970s. It 
is possible to speculate that this was attributable to the differences in the societal 
values, with New Zealand being a less litigious society. 
 
The original Act that came into effect in April 1974 did not include any references to 
medical misadventure. However the Accident Compensation Commission6 regarded 
personal injury caused by treatment as being within the scope of the legislation. A 
more detailed description of what injuries were to be considered under the AC Act, 
including medical misadventure, was published in the guidelines on how to respond to 
undefined provisions of the AC Act (Collins 1992).  
 
                                                 
6 The original title of the Accident Compensation Corporation 
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The first direct reference to medical injuries was enacted in the 1974 amendments to 
the AC Act, when personal injury by accident was defined as inclusive of ‘medical, 
surgical, dental, or first aid misadventure’ (AC Act 1972, section 2).  At this point the 
statute did not elaborate on the definition of medical misadventure, and the courts 
adopted informal and rather loose concepts of medical error and medical mishap. The 
former implied incorrect treatment and diagnostic failures, as well as a failure to 
inform of the risks associated with treatment. The latter covered cases when treatment 
was correct but resulted in a rare adverse outcome (Oliphant 2007).  
 
The lack of any statutory definition caused concern due to what was considered to be 
‘widely varying interpretations’ (Birch 1991, p.31) of the concept and blurred 
boundaries of the scheme. A series of High Court decisions highlighted the need for 
clarifying the scope of medical misadventure (Butler, 2004).  These issues were 
augmented by the concerns about financial viability of the scheme (Oliphant, 2007).  
Subsequent developments resulted in the new Act setting out an elaborate definition 
of medical misadventure. It formalised the scope of medical error and medical 
mishap.  Incongruent with the rest of the scheme, medical error required establishing 
negligence on the part of a health professional (Accident Rehabilitation and 
Compensation Insurance Act 1992, section 29).  
 
The next 13 years were the years of growing dissatisfaction with the medical 
misadventure criteria, and with the concept of medical error being misaligned with the 
rest of the no-fault scheme. A large scale review of medical misadventure provisions 
identified the need for change (Dyson 2003).  In July 2005 the concept of medical 
misadventure was replaced with new criteria of treatment injury (Injury Prevention, 
Rehabilitation, and Compensation Amendment Act (No 2) 2005, section 32). These 
criteria are described in more detail in the successive section on the relevant statutes. 
 
These changes endeavoured to achieve three key objectives:  
 
 to make the scheme fairer through extending scope for cover 
 to align this part of the legislation with the rest of the no-fault scheme through 
abolishing the error criterion   
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 to advance patient safety through encouraging open disclosure, information 
sharing and system approach (Dyson 2003).  
 
The change signified a further shift toward the state accepting a greater responsibility 
for medical injuries. It moved the focus from an individual health professional’s 
actions or omissions to act to the systems’ deficiencies. In this new paradigm the state 
assumes responsibility for most medical injuries, as well as for a system approach to 
prevention of adverse events in healthcare. 
 
Statutes related to adverse events in healthcare 
 
The AC Act remains the key statute for redressing medical injuries. It stipulates, 
however, that certain proceedings can be held under jurisdictions other than the courts 
(AC Act 2001, section 317(4)). The AC Act permits bringing proceedings for 
exemplary damages in the courts (AC Act 2001, section 319) as such proceedings 
serve a punitive and not compensatory purpose.  
 
Personal grievances that did not result in physical injuries can be pursued through the 
Health and Disability Commissioner, the Human Rights Review Tribunal, and the 
Health Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal. These avenues are important because they 
provide a means of redressing alleged negligence and substandard but non-injurious 
care. The statutes governing these agencies are complementary to the AC Act and set 
to facilitate exchange of information between the agencies.  
 
The scheme was never intended to act as a platform for ‘retribution, punishment or 
deterrence’ (Ferguson 2003, p.489).  The separation of the compensation scheme from 
the complains and disciplinary proceedings mitigates the tension between 
compensation and accountability (Manning 2010).  
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The Accident Compensation Act 2001  
 
The expressed purpose of the AC Act is to enhance the public good and reinforce the 
social contract. It is set out 
 
to enhance the public good and reinforce the social contract represented by 
the first accident compensation scheme by providing for a fair and 
sustainable scheme for managing personal injury that has, as it overriding 
goals, minimising both the overall incidence of injury in the community, and 
the impact of injury on the community. 
                                                                                (AC Act 2001, section 3) 
 
In respect to treatment injuries the Act is set out to mitigate consequences of adverse 
events for those who sustained injuries caused by treatment, and to reduce medical 
injuries through reduction of adverse events in healthcare.  
 
As a trade-off for the state providing for all accidental injuries, the statute enacted a 
bar on court proceedings for compensatory damages arising out of personal injuries 
covered under the AC Act: 
 
Proceedings for personal injury 
(1) No person may bring proceedings independently of this Act, whether under 
any rule of law or any enactment, in any court in New Zealand, for damages 
arising directly or indirectly out of— 
(a) personal injury covered by this Act; or 
(b) personal injury covered by the former Acts. 
                                                                                 (AC Act 2001, section 317). 
 
Since personal injuries caused by medical treatment were covered by the accident 
compensation statute, ban on medical litigation took away the health services 
consumers’ right to pursue claims for personal damages through the courts.  
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The treatment injury legislation enacted in July 2005 is regarded as a significant step 
forward in developing a fairer scheme and creating a culture supporting quality 
improvements in patient safety. Under the treatment injury regime the key criterion 
for cover is causal link between injury and medical treatment.  Several exclusion 
criteria are incorporated; the most commonly applied are the injury being ordinary or 
necessary part of treatment, or being caused ‘wholly or substantially’ by the 
underlying medical condition.  
 
(1) Treatment injury means personal injury that is - 
 
(a) suffered by a person –  
(i) seeking treatment from 1 or more registered health professionals; or 
(ii) receiving treatment from, or at the direction of, 1 or more registered health 
professionals; … and  
 
(b) caused by treatment, and  
 
      (c) not necessary part, or ordinary consequence, of the treatment, taking 
into account all the circumstances of the treatment, including –  
(i) the person’s underlying health condition at the time of the treatment; and  
(ii) the clinical knowledge at the time of the treatment. 
 
(2) Treatment injury does not include the following kinds of personal injury: 
 
(a) personal injury that is wholly or substantially caused by a person’s 
underlying health condition; 
(b) personal injury that is solely attributable to a resource allocation decision; 
(c) personal injury that is a result of a person unreasonably withholding or 
delaying their consent to undergo treatment. 
                                                                            (AC Act 2001, section 32) 
 
There is no reference in the legislation to a standard of care, and the focus is on 
patients, rather on the actions of health professionals. The other important new 
elements enacted in the amendments are the reporting of potential harm to the public 
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(AC Act 2001, section 284) and closer collaboration with the Health and Disability 
Commissioner (AC Act 2001, section 50(20)). Between 2005 and 2011 the 
Corporation made 1958 notifications of belief of risk of harm to the public (Tapp and 
Frew 2011).  The relevance of these amendments is discussed in the subsequent 
chapters. 
Other relevant statutes 
 
The AC Act providing cover and entitlements for medical injuries does not exist in a 
legislative vacuum. For the completeness of the scene it is essential to mention other 
avenues health services consumers can pursue when seeking redress for their personal 
injuries, or when dissatisfied with the quality of medical care.   
 
The no-fault approach led to development of other statutes with the focus on 
safeguarding quality of healthcare and health practitioners’ accountability.   The key 
statues that complement the AC Act in redressing damages and ensuring medical 
accountability are:  
 
 The Health and Disability Commissioner (H&DC) Act 1994 and the Code of 
Health and Disability Consumers’ Rights 
 The Health Practitioners Competence Assurance (HPCA) Act 2003 
 The Human Rights Act 1993 
 The Privacy Act 1993. 
 
These pieces of legislation focus on health services consumers’ rights and the 
agencies administered under these statutes are interrelated.  Each of the corresponding 
agencies has a specific function, and in most cases initiating proceedings under one of 
these statues does not preclude individuals from bringing their cases under other 
statutes’ jurisdictions.  
 
The Health and Disability Commissioner’s office is the most common avenue dealing 
with non-injurious claims. The H&DC was established following the findings of the 
national inquiry into the treatment of cervical smear at National Women’s Hospital 
(Cartwright 1988). The H&DC Act sets up the Commissioner’s purpose as  
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to promote and protect the rights of health consumers and disability services 
consumers, and, to that end, to facilitate the fair, simple, speedy, and 
efficient resolution of complaints relating to infringements of those rights. 
(Health and Disability Commissioner Act 1994, section 7) 
 
When a breach of patient’s rights warrants it, the Commissioner can refer a case to the 
Human Rights Review Tribunal (HRRT) or to the Health Practitioners Disciplinary 
Tribunal (HPDT), or both (Health and Disability Commissioner Act 1994, section 
34). 
 
The HRRT also considers cases brought under the Human Rights Act 1993 and the 
Privacy Act 1993.  The HRRT can reward punitive damages when there was a 
‘flagrant disregard’ of the consumer’s rights (Health Practitioners Competence 
Assurance Act 2003, section 57(1)).  
 
The Health Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal, governed by the Health Practitioners 
Competence Assurance Act 2003, has the authority to redress harm arising from 
professional misconduct (Health Practitioners Competence Assurance Act 2003, 
section 101).  
 
In addition to the above statutes criminal proceedings can be initiated for death 
allegedly caused by negligence. It is not a common route and by the year 1998 only 
eight cases of negligent conduct and prosecutions for manslaughter were reported 
(Skegg 1998). 
 
To sum up, the accident compensation law reform was brought about by the concerns 
with unfairness of tort law, and inclusion of medical injuries into the scheme was not 
driven by concerns about medical malpractice.  The legislative framework addressing 
medical injuries has evolved over the last four decades. It has eventually substituted 
tort law with no-fault redress for personal injuries caused by treatment.  Throughout 
its evolution the founding principles of the scheme have remained constant, and 
grounded in two distinct paradigms of community responsibility and causation.   
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CHAPTER TWO – ETHICAL PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING 
THE TREATMENT INJURY LEGISLATION 
 
The previous chapter outlined the history of the conception and evolution of the 
treatment injury legislation, and sketched the philosophical values laid in the 
foundation of the accident compensation scheme. These values were defined as 
community responsibility and comprehensive entitlements in the belief that ‘the 
achievement of real security was important for building a better society’ (Palmer 
2004, p.907).  
 
This chapter explores the ethical premises underpinning the fundamental principles of 
the scheme in relation to the treatment injury provisions of the AC Act. It examines 
the multiple dimensions of the conceptions of justice and fairness, and elaborates on 
the notions of beneficence and non-maleficence in the context of the treatment injury 
legislation. The chapter defines the key ethical tension as the conflict between 
distributive justice and social utility of the scheme. 
 
The accident compensation statute based on the Woodhouse Report’s 
recommendations translated the Report’s philosophical values into two fundamental 
goals:  
 to enhance the public good 
 to reinforce the social contract (AC Act 2001, section 3). 
 
These goals were to be achieved through the key objectives:  
 providing a fair and sustainable scheme for managing personal injury 
 minimising the overall incidence of injury and its impact on the community 
(AC Act 2001, section 3). 
 
The intent of the scheme encompasses a profound concept that interweaves 
throughout several interrelated and complex disciplines, such as political philosophy, 
economics, social science, law and moral inquiry.  It is at times impossible to separate 
one paradigm from another, and to disentangle political issues from economic 
considerations, and social issues from moral problems.  
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The goals and objectives of the statute suggest that the scheme is set to enhance both 
social utility (through increased efficiency and decreased injury costs) and justice 
(through fairer distribution of risks and benefits). It appears that both utility and 
justice are essential in shaping up the scheme.   
 
The key issues of the no-fault regime 
 
The treatment injury legislation holds a unique status within the accident 
compensation scheme. Adverse events in healthcare account for only a small fraction 
of the total burden of accidental injuries7.  However these events get disproportionate 
publicity because of the special nature of patient-clinician relationship. 
 
As briefly alluded to in the previous chapter, in most developed Western countries 
iatrogenic injuries are redressed under tort law. The New Zealand regime is one of 
very few comprehensive no-fault schemes that completely eliminated the requirement 
for an injured patient to prove the health professional’s negligence in court. Instead 
the scheme administered by the Accident Compensation Corporation assesses the 
claim and, if covered, the injured person receives appropriate entitlements, such as 
contributions towards treatment costs, weekly compensation for lost income, help at 
home and with childcare.  
 
The central philosophical principle of the Woodhouse Report is community 
responsibility, which is to distribute the risks and burdens of its citizens’ accidents 
amongst all the members. The accident compensation regime translated this 
philosophical principle into community liability for redressing harm. Society liability 
is grounded in the notion of a fair cooperation and represents a trade-off between the 
size of damages and the certainty of redress.  
 
In the context of the treatment injury legislation, underpinning the notion of 
community-wide liability and its objectives are the fundamental ethical conceptions of 
                                                 
7 In 2009-2010 out of total 1,662,327 new claims lodged with ACC the number of claims attributed to 
treatment injury account was 5,210 (0.3%) (ACC Annual Report 2010). 
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justice and fairness, beneficence and non-maleficence. Each conception has a 
multitude of facets and I attempt to examine some of them.   
 
Even critics of the scheme concede that the no-fault regime is a model superior to tort 
law in dealing with healthcare-related harm.  It is not the purpose of this essay to 
compare these two approaches to remediation for medical injuries. However, some 
degree of comparison is unavoidable and integral to the subsequent discussion so it is 
worthwhile to sketch some of the key advantages of the no-fault regime.  Some of 
these advantages have been outlined as a faster access to compensation for a greater 
number of affected patients, more effective dealing with complaints and more 
effective processes for clinicians’ accountability (Bismark and Paterson 2006). 
 
Being a product of the non-ideal world, the no-fault approach is not a regime without 
its own imperfections, and several important questions warrant close consideration.  
First, is the no-fault regime fair to claimants? Does it provide fair and satisfactory 
remedies for redressing treatment injuries? Does it satisfy their need for justice?   
Second, providing cover and benefits to groups of people with similar incapacities 
based on causation of these incapacities suggests inequities. Inequity may be unfair. Is 
it morally defensible to use injury causation as the main criterion for allocation of 
benefits?  Third, does a no-fault approach compromise safety of clinical practice 
through not providing incentives for improvements in the quality of medical care?  
Lastly, are the terms of cooperation resulting in relinquishing the right to litigate in 
exchange for universal access to the scheme fair? Does the statutory bar on litigation 
represent a fair trade-off between the size of damages and the certainty of recovery?  
 
The common theme in most of these questions is a concern about justice and fairness.  
To examine these issues it is first necessary to elaborate on the conceptions of justice 
and fairness in ethics. 
Justice and fairness 
 
Justice and fairness are the conceptions fundamental to morality. Both conceptions are 
interconnected but not identical, and a distinction between their meanings, if made, 
 23
can be artificial and subtle. Both terms are often used interchangeably and have a 
multitude of definitions and interpretations.  
 
Justice is often referred to as a standard of rightness: giving each person what the 
person deserves. Fairness is a notion commonly referred to in respect to a specific 
case, as well as being used in relation to our ability to make impartial judgements. A 
common egalitarian interpretation of justice and fairness is that fairness encompasses 
the moral intuition, and justice is driven by respect and a desire for fair treatment of 
people as moral equals (Avraham and Kohler-Hausmann 2005). 
 
Over the centuries the conceptions of justice and fairness have been debated and 
developed by various philosophical schools. In their modern version the conceptions 
embrace a multitude of facets. There seems to be a consensus among different 
philosophical schools that the key attributes of justice and fairness include equality, 
impartiality, reasonableness and rationality.  
 
Mill asserts that ‘justice implies something which is not only right thing to do, and 
wrong thing not to do, but which some individual person can claim from us as his 
moral right’ (Mill 1991, p.223).  
 
Beauchamp and Childress suggest the interpretation of justice as ‘fair, equitable, and 
appropriate treatment in light of what is due or owed to persons’ (Beauchamp and 
Childress 2009, p.241). 
 
In his innovative work Rawls unites both conceptions and develops a 
multidimensional notion of justice as fairness. Rawls applies the conception of justice 
as fairness to social institutions and practices, and defines justice as ‘essentially the 
elimination of arbitrary distinctions and the establishment, within the structure of a 
practice, of a proper balance between competing claims’ (Rawls 1958). 
 
Fairness embraces the notions of equality and impartiality. A fair legislation ought to 
promote the interests of everyone alike.  Aristotle defined equality as equal treatment 
of equals and unequal treatment of unequals in proportion to relevant inequalities 
(Gillon, 2003). The justice principle requires that individuals should be treated the 
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same unless they differ in ways that are relevant to the situation in which they are 
involved. However, people can be treated differently if criteria for this differentiation 
are deemed justifiable. One such criterion could be overall utility of the matter: ‘Each 
person maintains that equality is the dictate of justice, except where he thinks the 
expediency requires inequality.’ (Mill 1991, pp.19-20) 
 
Aligned with the idea of equality is the notion of desert: each person should receive 
what he or she deserves. In a general overview of the desert notion Mill holds that ‘a 
person is understood to deserve good is he does right…’ (Mill 1991, p.218). It would 
constitute injustice to reward equally deserving persons unequally.  
 
Fairness commands proportional sharing of benefits and burdens, and that can be 
achieved through society-wide liability.  Woodhouse suggests:  
 
[S]ince we all persist in following community activities, which year by 
year exact a predictable and inevitable price in bodily injury, so should we 
share in sustaining those who become the random but statistically 
necessary victims. The inherent cost of these community purposes should 
be borne on a basis of equity by the community. 
                                                                              (Woodhouse 1967, p.40) 
 
As all society benefits from provision and utilisation of healthcare, it seems fair that 
society as a whole is to share the costs of medical injuries rather than to shift the loss 
on those unlucky individuals who were injured in the course of medical treatment. 
 
Fairness requires reasonability and rationality. If a law produces outcomes that 
ordinary members of public deem unreasonable, it is bound to fall into contempt and 
precipitate public disquiet.  Reasonable terms of cooperation are those that the parties 
would deem fair, had they to find themselves in each other’s position (Rawls 1958).  
 
Mill asserts that it is ‘inconsistent with justice to be partial; to show favour or 
preference to one person over another, in matters to which favour and preference do 
not properly apply’ (Mill 1991, p.219).  
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Hart assigns particular relevance to justice in the evaluation of law and holds justice 
as one segment of morality, concerned with the way in which categories of 
individuals rather than individuals are treated (Hart 1961).  
 
Kaplow and Shavell argue that fairness should not be a solo criterion used for 
evaluating legal regime, and that morality of legal rules depends on its effects on the 
well-being of individuals. Their view is that ‘a taste for fairness is no different from a 
taste for a tangible good or anything else’ (Kaplow and Shavell 2000, p.9). In 
agreement with this view, arguing with the proponents of the ‘rational choice theory’ 
that defines rationality as a rigid pursuit of self-interest, Sen holds that a reasonable 
concern for the interests of others is an intrinsic part of fairness (Sen 2009) 
 
Making a judgement on what is just and fair can be challenging, as Sen succinctly 
asserts: ‘There could be different arguments suggesting disparate conclusions, and 
evaluations of justice may be anything but straightforward’ (Sen 2009, p.4).  
 
To assess fairness or unfairness of an action or inaction it is necessary to define the 
communities of equals in application to whom legal rules could be fair or unfair. In 
this essay I discuss justice and fairness in relation to three distinct categories:  
 
1. individuals harmed by medical treatment who fall within the remits of the accident 
compensation regime;  
2. individuals with disabilities and needs similar to the first group but not covered by 
the statute; 
3. New Zealand society as a whole.  
 
I start with examining whether the no-fault regime represents a satisfactory 
arrangement for individuals who are covered under the treatment injury legislation. 
Is this legislative framework a fair means of redressing treatment 
injuries? 
 
In many instances injury is not only a physical set back to one’s interests but a 
complex interaction of a multitude of harms.  While Shane and Susan, who were 
 26
deemed to have experienced treatment injury, would be receiving some benefits 
through compensation for their physical injuries, seeking compensation is only one of 
several reasons that motivate people to pursue justice. 
 
Much has been written about what embodies justice to healthcare services consumers 
(Bismark and Dauer 2006, Manning 2010).  Bismark & Dauer identified four 
categories of claimants’ motivation: restoration, communication, correction and 
sanction. Manning corresponds these categories to the objectives of tort law: 
compensation, corrective justice and deterrence, and highlights that in individual 
cases one motivation or objective frequently differs from one or more of others 
(Manning 2010). 
 
Restoration is concerned with redressing physical, financial and economic losses. The 
focus of the accident compensation scheme is on restoration through providing 
relevant entitlements when claim cover is granted.  These entitlements generally 
encompass treatment and rehabilitation costs, compensation for lost income and some 
other interventions as required on a case by case basis.  As the scheme has a set award 
schedule, claimants with similar incapacities get similar levels of compensation 
(Bismark and Dauer 2006).  
 
Inadequate communication and disclosure is another significant reason for people 
seeking redress. While in the absence of physical injuries the accident compensation 
scheme does not address these grievances, dissatisfied health services consumers can 
pursue their complaints through the Health and Disability Commissioner’s office.  
 
Concerns with quality of clinical practices and processes, and desire to ensure their 
appropriateness so as to prevent future occurrences of similar adverse event is another 
category. The inquiries into competencies and quality of practice can be addressed 
through the H&DC and Health Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal (HPDT).  The 
latter is also set up to hold health practitioners accountable for their actions.  
 
To reflect on substantive moral content of injury, Lazaar introduces the concept of 
injury as right-violation and defines two moral dimensions of injury: harm and wrong 
(Lazaar 2009). Harm represents damage to one’s interests (physical, emotional or 
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financial), while wrong represents disrespect for one’s moral equality. Lazaar argues 
that to rectify an injury both facets need to be addressed and devaluing one of the 
components may be insufficient for justice being attained. It can be argued that when 
applying this concept, the accident compensation scheme provides redress of harm, 
while other agencies provide redress for wrong. 
 
Overall, New Zealand has a well balanced system that supports multiple avenues for 
seeking justice. The accident compensation scheme is concerned with compensation 
and rehabilitation, leaving accountability to other disciplinary regimes (Manning 
2010).  The interests of affected individuals are met in an impartial and timely way, 
and in respect to this group there does not appear to be any significant moral conflict 
that would warrant further discussion.  
‘Horizontal inequity’? 
 
It appears that by limiting access to the scheme to casualties of accidents, society 
provides for them more favourably than for those who have the misfortune of ill-
health. The Woodhouse Report concedes that ‘in logic there is no answer’ to ‘how 
incapacity arising from sickness and disease can be left aside’, but a sense of realism 
and cost confined the scheme to injuries caused by accident (Woodhouse 1967, p.26).   
 
Society’s resources are finite, and resources allocated to one commodity (in this case 
sustaining the scheme) could be limiting resources channelled to other essential 
commodities, such as social programmes. Any community facing competing priorities 
and making choices on how to use and distribute limited resources needs robust 
principles to guide decision making. Distributive justice is concerned with ‘fair, 
equitable, and appropriate distribution determined by justified norms that structure the 
terms of social cooperation’ (Beauchamp and Childress 2009, p.241).  The theories 
and practical frameworks of distributive justice are intended to guide fair distribution 
of resources and benefits.  A legal regime that affects material allocation of benefits 
must be based on the principles of distributive justice, and ensure that individuals 
receive their fair share of opportunities and benefits available in society  (Beauchamp 
and Childress 2009). 
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The accident compensation scheme is set to enable a quick access to rehabilitation 
and restoration of health following injury. Health is regarded as a commodity of 
special moral importance because it is the means to normal functioning, and it is 
deemed a duty of the modern society to fairly distribute resources that support normal 
functioning (Daniels 2008). The gold standard of resource distribution in healthcare is 
allocation of services based on need and ability to benefit. Distinct from this approach 
to distribution, the accident compensation legislation sets out a distinct state-
determined distribution of benefits based on injury causation.   
 
To obtain cover, there must be established a causal nexus between the physical injury 
and the medical treatment.  Establishing causation can be just as much an obstacle to 
compensation under the treatment injury scheme as under tort law. It is universally 
acknowledged that aetiology of medical conditions may be multifactorial. To 
complicate the matters further, in many cases medical treatment is given to patients 
who are already compromised by injury or illness.  As Gaskins summarises it, 
‘injuries and disease are caused by complex web of interactive sources, which are 
continually reshaped by a dynamic risk environment’ (Gaskins 2004, p.967).  The 
legal test of causation in the case of treatment injury is the balance of probabilities, 
which is to prove that the probability of iatrogenic causation is greater than fifty 
percent.  Very often the boundaries between iatrogenic injury and pre-existing 
pathology are blurred. In light of scientific uncertainty, is it fair to distribute benefits 
according to the cause of incapacity rather than to the incapacitated person’s needs?  
 
Intuitively, exclusion of sickness affronts the natural feeling of justice. From the point 
of view of a person who lives with a disability caused by a congenital or chronic 
degenerative condition, the disparity in the levels of support based on cause and not 
on actual needs or losses seems unfair. However, emotions or intuition without 
reasoned appraisal are a poor source of valuation. Reason necessitates impartial 
analysis and considered inquiry, and impartiality requires detachment from one’s own 
vested interests. Mill asserts that ‘the feeling of justice might be a peculiar instinct, 
and might yet require, like all other instincts, to be controlled and enlightened by a 
higher reason’ (Mill 1991, p.216). Sandberg and Juth affirm that basing ethics solely 
on intuitions is as flawed as basing morality solely on reasoning, and a balance must 
be achieved between intuition and reasoning (Sandberg and Juth 2011). 
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In discussions on justice it is imperative to make a distinction between the notions of 
equity and equality, as they seem to be often used interchangeably and yet they are 
different.  Equity, or idea of fairness in distribution, is an economic concept based on 
the idea of moral equality. Inequity implies unfairness of distribution. Equality as a 
concept and its philosophical interpretation has evolved over the years. It involves 
comparisons between groups of people, and, depending on the discipline that 
examines it, could relate to moral equality, or to health, economic, or social 
characteristics of groups. It is important to distinguish the concept of equality 
deployed in ethics from the meaning of equality in other disciplines.  
 
The modern ethical meaning of equality is understood as treating people with equal 
respect and concern, rather than treating people uniformly, which is often implausible.  
Recognising persons’ equality does not necessitate identical treatment in any respects 
other than to the extent they have a moral claim for equal treatment (Gosepath 2007).  
 
The main criticism of the scheme was  that the distribution based on causation creates 
horizontal inequities for groups of people with similar incapacities (Duncan 2008, 
Stephens 2004). These inequities relate to preferential access to healthcare services 
for ACC clients, subsidised treatment costs, better access to work, education, home 
help, house and vehicle modifications and other assistance. ‘Horizontality’ in this 
instance refers to differences not based on inherent qualities, such as intelligence or 
health status, but attributed to factors external to individuals. The issue of inequity 
arising from the scheme was considered in-depth by the 1988 Royal Commission on 
Social Policy that examined the policy anomaly between providing for incapacities 
arising from accidents and non-accident related disabilities (Royal Commission on 
Social Policy 1988). The Commission concluded that in terms of level of 
compensation and access to healthcare the former group was ‘far better provided for’ 
than the latter, and that this resulted in an ‘inequitable’ situation (Duncan 2008, p.33). 
But does such inequity constitutes ethical inequality?  
 
The interpretation of the notion of ‘equal treatment’ requires some explanation. 
Beauchamp and Childress list several characteristics for equal treatment that 
constitute material principles of distributive justice in framing public policies and 
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legal rules. These principles determine distribution to each person in accordance with 
and on the basis of equality, need, effort, contribution, merit and free-market 
exchanges. All or some of these material principles shape public policies and laws 
that are involved in distribution of resources and grounded in distributive justice 
(Beauchamp and Childress, 2009).  
 
It appears that while distribution of benefits based on causation can lead to material 
inequalities, it does not represent unequal treatment of moral equals. As discussed in 
the subsequent chapter, some inequalities are acceptable if they work to the advantage 
of the least well-off (Rawls 1999).  
 
The advocates of eliminating discrepancies in distribution of benefits on the basis of 
causation claim that these discrepancies are an ‘ongoing source of disappointment and 
grievance’ (Duncan 2008, p.34). However, public acceptance of the legislation 
appears to remain high and in proportion to the number of cover decisions issued by 
the Corporation, the number of decisions challenged through the High Court and the 
Court of Appeal is very small. A search of the New Zealand Legal Information 
Institute database identified very few treatment injury claims considered by these 
Courts. Palmer asserts that public acceptance of the accident compensation scheme is 
high as ‘… despite the glaring social inequalities and discrimination creating by 
treating the two sets of social problems – sickness and injury – differently, there 
seems to be no great sense of public disquiet or agitation about the issue’ (Palmer 
2004, p.912). 
 
Other jurisdictions, such as the Human Rights Review Tribunal, show very few 
instances of disagreement with the accident compensation law in general. A high 
profile case considered by the HRRT drew significant publicity and generated much 
interest in the issue. Melanie Trevethick, who is suffering from Multiple Sclerosis, 
appealed to the HRRT on the grounds of discrimination against people with 
disabilities (Trevethick v Ministry of Health [2007] NZHRRT 7 (4 April 2007)). 
 
In a landmark decision the Tribunal highlighted that ‘there is a substantial social 
inequity arising out of the fact that similarly circumstanced people are treated 
differently depending on the cause of their disability. It is far from clear to us how 
 31
that state of affairs might be justified.’ (Trevethick v Ministry of Health [2007] 
NZHRRT 7 (4 April 2007), p.2).  Melanie’s claim did not succeed because it was ruled 
out that the basis of the differentiation was the cause of the claimant’s disability and 
not the disability itself. Hence the people with accident-related disabilities were not a 
valid comparator group and a case of discrimination was not proven. 
 
At the inception of the accident compensation scheme, the main argument for limiting 
access to the scheme was its economic viability. Unrestrained commitment to provide 
for all causes incapacities could diminish commitment to providing other important 
public goods:  
Advocates of a no-fault scheme are therefore faced with a dilemma: if they 
seek to compensate a greater number of claimants at the current rates they in 
danger of bankrupting the system; but if the rates are reduced to the levels 
that are normal with such schemes the integrity of the scheme is in danger of 
being undermined.  
                                                                                          (Capstick et al.1991, p.231) 
 
There does appear to be some tension between competing claims for distributive 
justice and social utility of the scheme, and I examine this tension in the subsequent 
chapter. 
 
Efficiency as a prerequisite for justice 
 
Efficiency is an important although not commonly discussed aspect of justice. 
Alluding to the distinction between the conception of justice in classical utilitarianism 
and the conception of justice as fairness, Rawls asserts that the latter embraces justice, 
benevolence and efficiency. Rawls states: ‘This conception assimilates justice to 
benevolence and the latter in turn to the most efficient design of institutions to 
promote the general welfare. Justice is a kind of efficiency’ (Rawls 1958). 
 
To ensure the scheme is sustainable, this legal regime ought to be efficient so that its 
total cost to society is lowest.  Efficiency implies the ability to redress medical 
injuries with minimal expenditure and effort.  
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In considering whether the no-fault approach is efficient, it is helpful to apply the 
economic framework developed for analysing tort liability rules (Calabresi 1970). 
Calabresi states that the ultimate goal of any accident liability regime ought to be 
minimising the costs of accidents. Calabresi framework helps address considerations 
of both justice and efficiency. 
 
In the discourse on morality of tort law, Calabresi seems to advocate for a social 
insurance no-fault regime when accidents are viewed as a ‘general societal problem’ 
rather than incidental events linking ‘one victim with one injurer’ (Calabresi 1970, 
p.308). Calabresi holds that there is no ‘logical necessity’ to link ‘treatment of 
victims, individually or as a group, to our treatment of injurers, individually or as 
group’ (Calabresi 1970, p.297).  In the even more powerful statement, Calabresi 
asserts that claiming a fault-based compensation system is the only solution to a fair 
remediation is ‘patent nonsense based on simplistic bilateral view of the accident 
problem’ (Calabresi 1970, p.301).  
 
In the context of healthcare-related harm this approach is justified even more than 
under the general accident scheme because more often than not there is no wrong 
done to patients, and, using the repealed definition of medical mishap iatrogenic 
injuries are often a result of ‘treatment properly given’ (IPRC Act 2001, section 34 
(repealed)). It is particularly apparent in cases of adverse reactions to medications. 
 
Calabresi defines three categories of accident-related costs: 
1. primary costs determined by incidence and severity of adverse events 
2. secondary costs arising as a result of the absence of risk-sharing, when 
affected individuals have to bear the recovery costs 
3. tertiary costs incurred by the judicial system through determining and 
enforcing liability.  
 
In respect to the treatment injury regime, supporting improvements in quality and 
safety in healthcare leads to reduction in incidence and severity of medical injuries, 
and that reduces primary costs. Risk spreading through social insurance and society-
wide liability reduces secondary costs because affected people can access 
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rehabilitation and compensation quickly, and at no additional cost to them.  While 
compensation plays a significant role to individuals in redressing medical injuries, of 
more importance to society is prompt access to rehabilitation that results in faster 
return to normal functioning. Distributing benefits and burdens of harm proportionally 
safeguards justice.  The no-fault regime and statutory bar on litigation enables 
avoidance of seemingly wasteful tertiary costs. Through the integration of the 
treatment injury legislation into the no-fault accident compensation scheme, the 
efficiency of redress for medical injuries is considerably greater than under tort law. 
 
There is enough empirical evidence that the no-fault scheme is more efficient than the 
tort system due to lower transaction costs. Richards and McLean, referring to the 
medical malpractice litigation system as ‘a failure’, point out that ‘more than fifty 
percent of the dollars are lost to transaction costs’ (Richards and McLean 2005, p.73).  
 
The proponents of tort law criticise the no-fault compensation scheme for taking away 
the right to sue for medical negligence.  That could suggest impingement of a 
person’s right to something the person is entitled to intrinsically. But the right to 
litigate through the courts is set by a legal system, and cannot be regarded a natural 
moral right, such as the right to life and liberty.  Relinquishing the right to litigate 
through the courts for personal damages does not represent violation of rights because 
the ‘right to sue’ is a social and political concept, and not a moral right.  
 
The question on the relationship between legal and moral rights is complex and not 
pursued in this essay.  It is relevant to note, however, Mill’s view on the connection 
between these concepts. Mill holds that society ought to safeguard fundamentals of 
individual wellbeing: ‘When we call anything a person’s right, we mean that he has a 
valid claim on society to protect him in the possession of it…’  (Mill 1991, p.226). 
Buchanan suggests that if Rawls’s theory included a right to litigate, it must have 
been a right ‘derivative upon the basic rights’ (Buchanan 1996, p.565) laid down by 
the three principles of the Rawlsean model.  There seems to be an agreement that 
legal rights ought to be based on moral rights but it is not to suggest that the right to 
litigate for personal injuries belongs to the fundamental human rights. 
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As a legal right, tort has been relinquished in law in exchange for an alternative right 
based on social insurance. It does not imply that the opportunity to pursue claims 
under tort law was a good right in the first instance. Mill asserts that ‘the legal right of 
which he is deprived, may be the rights which ought not to have belonged to him; in 
other words, the law which confers on him these rights, may be a bad law.’ (Mill 
1991, p.218) 
 
To sum up, efficiency is one of the vital ingredients of justice.  It is just and fair to 
society to support and maintain a no-fault regime because such regime is efficient in 
dealing with prevention and consequences of medical injuries.  
 
Beneficence, non-maleficence and patient safety8 
 
Distinct from the conception of justice but related to it in many ways are the 
fundamental ethical principles of beneficence and non-maleficence.  Medical 
treatment, whether diagnostic or therapeutic, is a high risk activity, and injuries 
caused by medical treatment are statistically certain to occur.  On par with the 
objective to ensure a fair and sustainable scheme, the statute’s objective is to 
minimise the burden of medical injury on the community.   
 
Underpinning this second objective are the ethical principles of beneficence and non-
maleficence. These two principles differ, although both have similarities in their 
means and ends. Overall, beneficence is concerned with advancing good, while non-
maleficence relates to preventing harm. 
 
In ethical theory beneficence is understood as inclusive of all forms of actions and 
rules that are designed to promote the benefit of other persons or groups of persons. 
Often promoting good requires preventing or removing possible harms. Beauchamp 
describes two variances of this principle: positive beneficence and utility beneficence 
(Beauchamp and Childress, 2009). The former requires promotion of benefits, the 
latter dictates that to achieve the best overall results benefits, risks and costs ought to 
be identified and balanced.  
                                                 
8 Patient safety is defined as ‘the absence of preventable harm to a patient during the process of health 
care.’ (WHO 2011) 
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Discussing the place of beneficence in the utilitarian theory, Beauchamp refers to 
Mill’s view that beneficence can be a single unifying standard that helps us with 
forming rational opinions on rightness or wrongness of actions and practices, 
regardless of moral theory used in decision making (Beauchamp 2008). The principle 
of utility beneficence suggests that the beneficial consequences of the legislation need 
to be weighted against risks and possible harms. If an action or a rule results in the 
greatest possible balance of beneficial consequences, or at least in the least possible 
balance of harmful outcomes, then the action is regarded as ethically sound.  
 
In the context of the treatment injury legislation, positive beneficence is reflected in 
provision of prompt and comprehensive cover for patients who suffered adverse 
events in healthcare, and providing compensatory damages, when appropriate. The 
benefits to society as a whole, as well to individual patients, are improvements in 
quality of clinical care achieved though no-blame culture conducive to disclosure of 
adverse events, more open communication and learning from mistakes. It is in 
contrast to tort law that is ‘positively counter-productive’ to patient safety as it 
‘provides a clear incentive not to report, or to cover up, an error or incident. (Tingle 
2011, p.1). 
 
Hoppe argues that the principle of non-maleficence is of a very limited interest under 
tort law because it is only applicable when harm is caused deliberately (Hoppe, 2011). 
In contrast, under the no-fault regime this principle plays a significant role. First, the 
legislation supports prevention of more serious harm to individual patients who were 
injured by treatment. That is achieved through patients getting prompt access to 
relevant treatment and rehabilitation services. Furthermore, the principle of non-
maleficence also underpins a system approach to investigations of causes of adverse 
events, and prevention of potential harm to the public. Reporting of risk of harm to 
the Director General of Health and, under some extraordinary circumstances, to 
professional registration bodies, can result in actions that prevent potential harm from 
occurring.   
 
The principles of justice are interrelated with the principles of beneficence and non-
maleficence. Under certain circumstances principles of justice may need to be 
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superseded in favour of other categories of moral claims, such as society’s welfare.  If 
the accident compensation statute was to distribute costs and risks fairly but 
precipitate increase in burden of treatment injuries, then it is unlikely that fair 
distribution would be an advantage over reasonable risk reduction. Hence harm 
reduction has a significant utility value and can be regarded as a distinct public good.  
 
In the context of treatment injuries harm has several dimensions. Its private side is 
harm to affected individuals, whether it is physical, emotional, financial harm or a 
combination of any of these. In its public dimension not only the affected individuals 
but the society as a whole suffers a set-back to its interests. Public harm results from 
substandard medical practices, and it can generate a lack of security and mistrust in 
the medical profession (Lazaar 2009). Improvements in patient safety are aimed at 
mitigating both private and public harm.  
 
The treatment injury legislation is set to achieve risk and harm reduction through 
reducing the incidence and impact of medical injuries. The former is thought to be 
achieved through improvements in incident reporting, disclosure of adverse events 
and enhanced learning. The latter is to be attained through expediting cover decisions, 
which helps with providing timely rehabilitation for those who sustained medical 
injury.  
 
In the past it was claimed that medical malpractice litigation achieves two social 
objectives: maintaining good medical standards and compensating victims of 
negligent treatment (Collins 1992). The ongoing debate about the impact on the no-
fault medical injury compensation approach provides two conflicting views on its 
effects on quality of medical care. 
 
One camp represents the view that a no-fault scheme does not provide incentives for 
quality improvements and safer medical practice, and that tort law with its fear of 
litigation is a powerful deterrent for substandard medical care. The proponents of this 
view claim that the system has eroded individual responsibility, and, in the process, 
has diminished the extent to which it can offer incentives to those who have an 
opportunity to influence safety. For instance, Howell argues that this system does not 
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encourage better quality of care and enhanced prevention, and shifts risks from 
practitioners and medical administrators to individuals (Howell 2004). 
 
The opposite camp holds that little empirical evidence exists on malpractice law as a 
deterrent to negligent conduct and a facilitator of improved patient safety and quality 
of medical care (Outerbridge 2004, Luntz 2004, Roberts 2004, Richards and McLean 
2005, Tingle 2011).   
 
Luntz points out that the threat of litigation deters innovative treatment and 
discourages ‘worthwhile activity unless insurance against liability can be obtained at 
an affordable cost’ (Luntz, 2004, p.902). Likewise, Richards and McLean assert that 
the medical malpractice framework ‘does not provide workable incentives to reduce 
injuries’ and ‘impedes the adoption of better medical care practices…’ (Richards and 
McLean 2005, p.18). 
 
The no-fault regime is corroborated by the system approach to analysing causes of 
adverse events in healthcare. The concept, commonly referred to as the Swiss cheese 
model, was developed by James Reason  (Reason 2000). This concept suggests that 
nearly all accidents are a result of a chain of failures, when all ‘holes’ in each 
protective layer align, like a stack of slices of Swiss cheese. The aligned ‘holes’, or 
weaknesses in defence mechanisms, create opportunities for accident, and it would be 
unfair to attribute full responsibility for the accident to the last slice of cheese in the 
stack.  
 
James Reason acknowledges human fallibility and inevitability of accidents in 
medical care, and recognises that a majority of accidents in healthcare are not 
egregious or negligent. Hence placing blame on an individual does not help with 
addressing the causes of ill events. The model regards human errors not as causes but 
rather as consequences of preceding events, and emphasises that adherence to 
assigning blame to individual practitioners hinders improvements in healthcare. 
Reason asserts that creating a culture fair to the practitioners is a vital prerequisite to 
improvements in patient safety. 
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Using the Swiss cheese model, Roberts refers to the highly publicised Bottrill case as 
a classical example of a system failure, and attributes the disastrous outcome to a 
combination of the individual clinician’s incompetence with the failure to monitor 
effectively the standard of his performance.9 Roberts concludes that financial 
incentives and litigious disincentives do not affect quality of clinical practice, as the 
healthcare quality is driven by professional virtues and internal morality (Roberts 
2004).  
 
In considering overall utility of the scheme if it important to determine whether the 
no-fault regime facilitates improvements in quality of medical care as well as prevents 
and diminishes harm.  If, as likely, the no-fault scheme results in overall harm 
reduction, then such legal regime enhances common good.  
 
To sum up, the key objectives of the treatment injury legislation are to provide a fair 
and sustainable scheme for redressing iatrogenic injuries, and to reduce harm arising 
from injuries in healthcare. These objectives are grounded in the ethical principles of 
justice and fairness, beneficence and non-maleficence. The treatment injury regime, 
complemented by other statutes, provides a just means of redressing medical injuries 
covered under its auspices, and an efficient structure promoting beneficence (through 
improvement in quality of medical care) and non-maleficence (through system-
focused harm reduction). However the scheme attracts criticism in respect to inequity, 
claiming unjust resource distribution that is based on injury causation rather than 
need. It appears that the key ethical dilemma that warrants scrutiny can be defined as 
the conflict between social utility of the scheme and distributive justice. 
 
                                                 
9 The high profile ‘Bottrill inquiry’ established that between 1990 and 1996 a semi-retired pathologist 
Dr Bottrill misread and under-reported a considerable number of smears positive for cervical cancer. At 
least 16 women have developed cervical cancer following reporting of their smear tests as normal. The 
Ministerial Inquiry into the case identified several systemic issues that resulted in the failure (Duffy et 
al, 2001) 
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CHAPTER THREE – THE MAJOR THEORIES OF 
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 
FOR TREATMENT INJURY LEGISLATION 
 
 
This chapter outlines two philosophical doctrines on distributive justice, utilitarianism 
and egalitarianism, with Rawlsean justice as fairness as the most influential 
egalitarian theory. It then applies both philosophical frameworks to analysis of the 
ethical dilemma identified in relation to the no-fault treatment injury regime.   
 
The major theories of distributive justice 
 
I have selected utilitarianism and egalitarianism for this evaluation because these 
theories provide the most influential analytical frameworks of justice and represent 
two distinct philosophical schools approaching the issue of justice from different 
perspectives.  The concept of wide reflective equilibrium suggests deploying 
perspectives of divergent moral theories in analysing complex moral problems. If 
testing by the two theories leads to the same conclusion, then it provides some 
assurance on the rightness of the action, rule or policy. If the conclusions under each 




Utilitarianism is the most prominent theory of consequentialism philosophy. It is one 
of several variations of the classical consequentialism that share a common approach 
of assessing morality of actions in relation to the consequences these actions produce. 
Under the utilitarian framework a morally right action generates the overall best result 
if it brings about the greatest overall utility.  
 
The theory originated in the Jeremy Bentham’s “Introduction to the Principles of 
Morals and Legislation”. Bentham holds that society ought to adopt laws that will 
maximise utility and produce ‘the greatest happiness of the greatest number’ 
(Bentham 1781, p.5).  
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A subsection of this philosophical doctrine, rule utilitarianism, is concerned with 
considering the consequences of assuming certain rules. Rule utilitarianism provides 
an analytical framework that can help with analysing morality of institutions, policies 
and legislation. The utilitarian approach does not include any commitment to equality 
of distribution, and its concern with maximising society’s welfare can affect 
individual interests (Beauchamp and Childress 2009). Under the utilitarian principles 
the interests of individuals are set to be sacrificed for the greater good - the 
cumulative interests on the community.  
 
In the original theory the conception of utility was limited in scope and included 
hedonistic goods, such as happiness and pleasure, as the key goods.  The theory was 
later developed and enhanced by John Stuart Mill, who asserted that the concept of 
justice bears utility value, and can be explained in utilitarian terms. In the 
fundamental work “On Liberty and Other Essays” Mill states:  ‘It has always been 
evident that all cases of justice are also cases of expediency: the difference is in the 
peculiar sentiment which attaches to the former, as contradistinguished from the 
latter.’ (Mill 1991, p.234) 
 
Extending Mill’s view of justice as a utilitarian good, Kaplow and Shavell argue that 
fairness is a common good because it possesses instrumental social value and 
corresponds with internalised social norms. Every community has a set of norms 
important to that community. When people think of ‘unfairness’ of rules they attach 
importance to fairness because it is an internalised social norm (Kaplow and Shavell 
2000). 
 
Contemporary utilitarianism is described as both, consequences- and beneficence-
based, inasmuch as it regards rules and institutions moral if they promote society’s 
welfare (Beauchamp and Childress, 2009). The modern notion of utilitarian goods is 
generally broader than under the original conception and includes everything that an 
individual may value.  The goal of modern utilitarianism is to achieve the greatest 
good to society by balancing competing claims of all affected individuals. Utilitarian 
goods in a broad sense can embrace a diverse range of elements, from societal 
wellbeing to efficiency in reaching the goal of maximising benefits for the society as a 
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whole. Some goods, such as costs, are tangible and measurable. Others, like life 
fulfilment, security, satisfaction, protection against risk, empathetic feelings for 
others, are nebulous and impossible to quantify.  
 
Mill asserts that the feeling of security is ‘the most vital of all interests’ and 
something  
no human being can possibly do without; on it we depend for all our 
immunity from evil and for the whole value of all and every good, beyond 
the passing moment; since nothing but the gratification of the instant could 
be of any worth to us, if we could be deprived of everything the next 
instant.  
                                                                                                     (Mill 1991, p.226) 
Although it is not possible to compute the sense of security, it is one of the 
fundamental goods the accident compensation statute intended to achieve. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, the achievement of security was a factor 
influencing the choice of society-wide liability. Equal distribution of risks and costs 
of harm provides security through giving assurance of prompt rehabilitation and 
compensation in case of adverse events in healthcare. 
 
To put it simplistically, a utilitarian perspective is that community’s welfare should be 
the single important criterion for selecting legal rules governing society.  It suggests 
that if the distribution based on harm causation was eliminated, then good reasons 
ought to be provided on ‘why a society should willingly make (possibly all) its 
members worse off in order to advance a particular conception of fairness’ (Kaplow 
and Shavell 2000, p.6). It is recognised that ‘… under certain circumstances at least, 
utility could be maximised by providing extensive healthcare only for some groups, 
perhaps even a minority, rather than for all people.’ (Beauchamp and Childress 2009) 
 
Egalitarian view on accident law  
 
Egalitarianism is a theory of justice concerned with fair allocation of burdens and 
benefits among the members of society. While utilitarian distributive justice 
emphasises striving towards maximum net social utility, egalitarian theories 
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accentuate fairness in access to public goods, commonly appealing to material 
principles of equality and need.   
 
Egalitarian doctrines require that individuals ought to be allocated an equal share of 
certain goods, such as wealth and medical care. It is important to note that no 
prominent egalitarian theory suggests equal distribution of ‘all possible social 
benefits’ (Beauchamp and Childress, 2009 p.247). 
 
Within the distributive justice framework, egalitarians introduce the concept of 
equalisandum: a property or a factor that is to be equalised, whether it is income, 
opportunities or other matters that society needs to address. The problem, as Sen 
points out, is to decide on what properties and to what extent society ought to 
equalise. Equal opportunities can correlate with substantially unequal income, 
inequality of income does not necessarily result in unequal wealth, equal wealth does 
not automatically equate to equal happiness, and equal happiness can represent 
divergent fulfilment of needs (Sen 1979). 
 
In the context of accident law, egalitarians use the notion of luck to accentuate 
accident-related disparities in distribution of burdens and benefits , and to differentiate 
between adverse outcomes resulting from informed choices and those resulting from 
fate or fortune (Avraham and Kohler-Hausmann 2005).  
 
In relation to iatrogenic injuries luck has two facets: first being the recipient of ‘bad 
luck’ in an adverse event in healthcare, and then testing one’s luck through the 
‘lottery of compensation’ in medical liability litigation.  The no-fault insurance 
attempts to negate the latter, thus accommodating the substantive commitment to 
egalitarian fairness. 
 
Dworkin describes the concept of ‘option luck’ and ‘brute luck’ to help distinguish 
between luck and responsibility for one’s actions (Dworkin 1981).   Option luck is 
associated with an action of choice, and it does not play a major role in this 
discussion. With rare exceptions, such as injuries due to refusal to give consent to life-
saving procedure or non-compliance with therapeutic regime, treatment injuries are 
beyond the injured person’s control and responsibility.   In contrast, brute luck is 
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brought about by the circumstances outside individual’s control, and not resulted from 
the individual’s choices and actions.  Egalitarians deem it society’s responsibility to 
mitigate brute luck. 
 
In addition to option and brute luck, luck defined as constitutive is idiosyncratic to 
one’s genetic make up and lifestyle choices. Predisposition to adverse reaction to 
certain treatments, for instance, hypersensitivity to antibiotics, could be classed as 
constitutive luck.  In many instances treatment injuries can be construed as a result of 
brute luck or of a combination of constitutive and brute luck.  An example of the 
former is dental injury caused by anaesthetic intubation. The latter is illustrated by 
unpredictable reaction to medications, for instance Steven-Johnson syndrome caused 
by commonly used non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs.  
 
Unlike utilitarianism, the egalitarian principles commit to fairness through attempting 
to negate the role of bad luck in determining one’s burdens and benefits and offering 
equal terms of remediation. 
Rawls’ justice as fairness 
 
Rawls’ conception of justice as fairness is the most influential twentieth century 
egalitarian theory of justice.  It was originally set out in “Justice as Fairness” (Rawls 
1958), and subsequently developed and revised in “A Theory of Justice” (Rawls 1971, 
Rawls 1999) and “Justice as Fairness. A Restatement” (Rawls 2001).  Rawls argues 
that classical utilitarianism is unable to account for the aspect of fairness in justice, 
and that striving towards maximising common good is not to be confused with a good 
society (Rawls 1958).  
 
Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness asserts three fundamental principles that set out a 
framework for making considered moral judgements.  The first, the Liberty Principle, 
stipulates greatest equal liberty when each individual is entitled to equal rights to the 




The second, the Equality Principle, accommodates the Fair Equality of Opportunity 
and the Difference Principle. Rawls summarises these principles as ‘social and 
economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: 
 reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage and  
 attached to offices and positions open to all.’ (Rawls 1999, p.53) 
 
In the context of the accident compensation scheme the Equality Principle, and in 
particular the Difference Principle, are relevant to the discussion on fairness of 
distribution of benefits based on a single criterion of harm causation, and on fairness 
of terms of cooperation.  
 
The Difference Principle further stipulates that some inequalities are permissible and 
fair if they are to the overall advantage of everyone, and primarily to the least well 
off: ‘…inequalities of wealth… are just only if they result in compensating benefits 
for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members of society’ (Rawls 
1999, p13).  
 
In reference to the misfortune and bad luck concepts, and to simplify the argument, it 
can be asserted that individuals affected by treatment injuries are worse off than those 
affected by illness. The former not only had an illness for which they sought 
treatment, but they also had bad luck of either this illness being undiagnosed or 
suffering adverse event, with the outcome at times being worse than the condition for 
which they sought medical attention. The most common examples are bowel 
perforation during diagnostic colonoscopy and rupture of eardrum caused by ear 
syringing on a blocked ear. 
 
Integral to Rawls’ theory is the concept of primary goods, defined as ‘things which it 
is supposed a rational man wants whatever else he wants’ (Rawls 1999, p.79).  Rawls 
sets up an index of primary social goods to provide a standard for interpersonal 
comparison. The index includes rights, income, wealth, and is used to identify the 




Linked to the concept of primary good and to the utilitarian conception of social 
utility is the notion of common good defined as ‘certain general conditions that are… 
equally to everyone’s advantage’ (Rawls 1971).  
 
Rawls construes the choice of principles of justice as an ideal social contract. The idea 
of a social contract allows us to view principles of justice as the object of a rational 
and impartial collective choice, where the terms of cooperation are acceptable and 
agreed upon by all engaged in it. The central feature of the social contract account of 
justice is the concept of the original position when ‘the principles of justice are chosen 
behind a veil of ignorance’ (Rawls 1999, p.11). 
 
This philosophical concept suggests selection of fundamental principles of justice by 
all participants under hypothetical conditions when they would have been deprived of 
their personal characteristics, and would not have known whether the choice they 
make would have advanced their personal interests. Rawls suggests that the principle 
of justice made in the original position would be an indication of the structure of 
society the participants would have chosen to live in. In respect to treatment injury 
legislation, had a regime of redress for medical injuries been chosen ‘behind a veil of 
ignorance’, would have it adopted the no-fault comprehensive scheme? 
 
Implications of the theories of distributive justice for 
treatment injury legislation 
 
There seem to be two problems with deploying Rawls’ theory in the analysis of the 
treatment injury regime, which essentially is a set of legal rules determined by 
government policy.  
 
First, Rawls emphasises that his theory is intended as a political conception, 
applicable to the design of political, social and economic institutions. In his works 
Rawls appears to be ambiguous on whether justice as fairness can be extrapolated to a 
general moral conception (Rawls 1985). The Principle of Equality of Fair Opportunity 
does not appear to be directly relevant to assessing law because it refers not to 
opportunities in general, but rather to specific equal opportunities for accessing 
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offices and positions.  Second, the theory offers a justice framework for a perfect 
society, and direct application of this theory may be not appropriate for analysing 
existing legal rules in the non-ideal world. However, some elements of the Rawls’ 
model seem to be applicable in this analysis. 
 
Daniels extends Rawls theory to include health needs and argues that health needs are 
one of the primary social goods.  Daniels’ view is that while healthcare is not part of 
the original Rawlsean index, inclusion of healthcare is justifiable because fair 
distribution of healthcare provides for fair equality of opportunity.   Daniels argues 
that a just society has an obligation to meet healthcare needs because much of health 
and disability are determined by social and economic status, and are to a significant 
extent effects of the social lottery as the result of a natural lottery  (Daniels 2008).  
 
The previous chapters defined the key ethical tension as the competing interests of 
social utility and distributive justice. I limit the scope of the subsequent discussion to 
two aspects of this tension: 
1. fairness of distribution of benefits based on the single criterion of causation; 
2. fairness of the terms of cooperation set by the AC Act. 
 
I deploy the egalitarian notion of luck to analysis of the individual cases, assuming the 
same reasoning can be generalised to fairness of distribution based on injury 
causation. I then test fairness of the terms of cooperation from the perspectives of 
utilitarianism and justice as fairness. 
Fairness of distribution based on causation  
 
Within the scope of the treatment injury cover provisions, apart from several 
exclusion criteria, the main and essential criterion for cover is a causal link between 
physical injury and medical treatment. The statute does not single out any other 
factors, such as age, race, gender, employment or social status to influence eligibility 
for cover.  Is injury causation a fair criterion for distribution of benefits? 
 
Referring to the cited case studies, intuitively it seems unfair that John and Shane, 
both having similar needs, would be receiving disparate benefits. Shane would be 
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receiving appropriate entitlements provided under the AC Act, such as ‘rehabilitation, 
including treatment, social and vocational rehabilitation, and compensation.’ (AC Act 
2001, section 69). John’s treatment and rehabilitation needs would be met by the 
publicly funded health system that is generally prioritises services on the basis of 
clinical need and ability to benefit.  
 
In reality it is possible that Shane’s and John’s treatment and rehabilitation pathways 
would be similar in respect to timeliness and level of care. Conversely, it is also 
possible that John would not be getting the same level and timeliness of services. In 
case their treatment and rehabilitation routes differ, it would not be possible to 
ascertain at this individual level whether these differences in care resulted in different 
outcomes, such as the extent of their clinical, social and vocational rehabilitation. 
Furthermore, if any differences were identified, it would not have been possible to 
attribute the differences in outcomes to clinical care.  The only significant difference 
between Shane and John could be in compensation, and only if both were employed at 
the time of the injury.  For the sake of argument let us assume that Shane’s position 
will be better off than John’s because of the entitlements Shane will be getting under 
the treatment injury cover. 
 
As discussed previously, the concept of desert in fairness commands that it is unjust 
to unequally reward equally deserving persons. Assuming that in any other respect 
John and Shane are equal, the key difference between them is that harm is done to the 
latter. In the egalitarian terms, John’s misfortune can be construed as a combination of 
constitutive luck (genetic predisposition) and optional luck (lifestyle choices, such as 
smoking and diet). Shane’s misfortune is further aggravated by brute luck, which is 
this case resulted in delayed diagnosis. That makes Shane worse off than John, and 
that is the brute luck the legislation is set to correct. In this respect it seems fair to 
expect the burden of assistance to Shane to be borne collectively by society. ‘Some 
disadvantages are mere unfortunate… while others are unfair, and therefore 
obligatory in justice to correct’ (Beauchamp and Childress 2009, p.250).  
 
In the given scenarios we assume that Shane and John are equal in all respects except 
for harm causation, and that may well be the case. They both have the same medical 
problem (cerebral artery aneurysm) that resulted in the intracranial bleeding, they both 
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suffered significant neurological damage as a result of the haemorrhage. We know 
nothing of either person’s circumstances, such as age, race, or socio-economic status, 
although all these factors are important in a variety of ways for the resulting 
differences in Shane’s and John’s positions.   
 
It is possible to imagine a scenario where intuitively Shane would appear more 
deserving than John. For instance, if John’s misfortune was to greater extent due to 
option luck, such as John’s lifestyle choices that increased his chances of ill-health. 
 
The most common causes of brain aneurysms are congenital abnormalities, high 
blood pressure, atherosclerosis, and head injury.   Let us assume that Shane had a 
congenital defect in the cerebral artery, but otherwise led an impeccably healthy life, 
exercising and watching his diet. The aneurysm rupture was due to the natural 
progression of the congenital pathology and Shane had no means of identifying it 
earlier or preventing the deterioration and the resulting rupture.  
 
In contrast, John’s unhealthy lifestyle was a major contributor to his stroke, and John 
could have had considerably reduced the chances of its occurrence had he taken 
reasonable steps to modify his lifestyle and to control his high blood pressure.  
Furthermore, John could have had more resources to mitigate for unhealthy lifestyle, 
such as better education and higher income than Shane, but he did not make an effort 
to benefit from these resources. Under these circumstances, would it appear fair to 
reward damages to Shane when intuitively it seems that Shane is more deserving than 
John? 
 
If we accept that fairness is to give a person what the person deserves and ‘a person is 
understood to deserve good if he does right’ (Mill 1991, p.218), then Shane, who did 
no wrong, would be recognised as a more deserving recipient of benefits. 
 
What constitutes fairness in this context is that the law is impartial because it is 
concerned with a specific event and a causal nexus to this event and not with a 
person who was harmed or injured through the specific event.  
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It is conceivable that John could have a misfortune of another adverse medical event, 
and receive cover and entitlement for that event, so John is not excluded as a person 
but because of the particular circumstances of his case. 
 
The same logic is applicable in cases of Susan and Mary. In these instances the 
difference in entitlements could be even smaller because the entitlements relate to a 
proportion of incapacity, in this case attributable to advancement of cancer, but not to 
the entire pathology. Mary’s right to healthcare is not compromised because her 
health needs are likely to be met with the same urgency as Susan’s by the healthcare 
system funded through general taxation.  
 
On reflection, causation seems to be a reasonable and rational criterion for 
distribution of benefits if it is universally and systematically applied to injuries and 
events as it is impersonal and concerned with circumstances of the case and not with 
an individual. 
 
Balancing social utility and justice 
 
The previous discussion identified social utility of the scheme and distributive justice 
as the key competing interests. Applying and comparing utilitarian and justice as 
fairness perspectives to this tension helps guide reasoning on ethical robustness of the 
treatment injury regime. 
 
As the utilitarian objective of the scheme is to maximise common good, it is useful to 
reiterate the substantive utility goods related to the treatment injury legislation. These 
goods can be roughly grouped into three categories:  
 measurable benefits:  efficient administration of the scheme, fast and fair 
access to rehabilitation and compensation for injured patients. Fast access to 
rehabilitation is expected to be translated into faster return to work, either paid 
or unpaid; 
 unquantifiable benefits:  feeling of security in accessing remediation, feeling 
of social solidarity and living in society that is fair to its citizens; 
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 likely but difficult to measure benefits: beneficence and non-maleficence 
through improved quality of healthcare and harm reduction. 
 
Many of these goods are interconnected and related to the normative elements of 
justice. As discussed previously, efficiency is a pre-requisite for fairness and 
maintaining an inefficient legal regime would be unfair to society; the no-fault 
approach to harm is thought to advance beneficence and non-maleficence.  
 
Economic inequalities and health disparities carry a significant utility weight from the 
perspectives of both theories. From the utilitarian perspective, overall utility of the 
scheme is maximised through linking provision of benefits to cause of injury. It is 
recognised that distribution of benefits based on injury causation results in some 
degree of material inequalities between groups of people with similar disabilities and 
needs. However do economic inequalities translate into health inequalities? The 
notion of health inequalities is a public health concept that does not apply at an 
individual level. Does the difference in provision of benefits for persons with illness 
and with treatment injuries lead to health inequalities between these two groups? If it 
did, then social utility of the scheme would have been diminished.  
 
However, there is no empirical evidence to show that at a population level health 
status and rehabilitation outcomes for people who do not get cover under the scheme 
are worse than for those who do get cover. People with ill-health do get access to 
medical care, and John and Mary would be still receiving treatment and rehabilitation 
through the publicly funded health system. Furthermore, the numbers of the covered 
treatment injuries are relatively small, and hence unlikely to become a major 
contributor to health inequalities at a population level.  
 
In the foundation of the selection of cause of injury as the distribution criterion rests a 
powerful economic argument. At its inception the scheme was funded from the 
reduction in compliance costs associated with tort law. If extended to ill-health, no 
such costs would be released, hence removal of inequalities would require a 
considerable financial commitment that society would not be able to afford (Easton 
2004).  To paraphrase Rawls, equalities that are not to the benefit of all are unjust. It 
is not in disagreement with the Mill’s position that some inequalities are to be 
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tolerated and social utility ought to take precedence over a right to equality of 
treatment. In the treatment injury context the ‘equality of treatment’ applies to making 
a distinction between two groups (the injured and the sick). It does not imply, 
however, inequality in the ethical sense. Systematically applying causation as the 
distribution criterion across the population, the legislation treats all individuals as 
moral equals. Furthermore, these material inequalities may be justified in Rawlsean 
terms if the alternative is a return to tort law. 
 
To reiterate the Difference Principle, some inequalities are permissible if they are to 
the benefit of all, and in particular to the advantage of the least well off. Adopting the 
egalitarian principle of brute luck, patients who were injured as a result of treatment 
sought for ill-health are worse off then those who suffer ill-health not compounded by 
iatrogenic harm.  
 
Society-wide liability represents social insurance that reflects the idea of dispersing 
the costs of injuries across the population rather than placing the burden of injuries on 
victims who may or may not be able to recover some or the entire burden through 
private insurance or tort. It seems fair that the costs associated with treatment injuries 
should be shared by all those who benefit from provision of good quality medical 
care. However, it is a misleading generalisation to view society as a monolith entity 
where all its elements are identical in their preferences.  Society is a congregation of 
individuals with diverse aims and ends, and the principle of social choice can differ 
and directly conflict with the principles of individual choice. Some people may prefer 
to opt for legal rules that would allow them to contest their claims through courts, in 
an attempt to obtain greater satisfaction and compensation. Honore asserts that  ‘in 
pluralistic societies people often disagree about the values they should individually or 
collectively pursue; disagreement about values is normal and may be valuable’ 
(Honore 1993, p.12).  
 
To balance diverse views at a societal level the principle of fairness denotes that 
disagreements are to be solved by agreed principles of cooperation. Terms of 
cooperation are fair if all its participants regard the terms as reasonable, acceptable 
and beneficial. Such terms also imply ‘comparing burdens and benefits to those 
affected under alternative possible principles of cooperation’ (Keating 2010, p.1867).  
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This approach could be the key to determining ethical soundness of the treatment 
injury legislation, and to unify both, utilitarian and justice as fairness, perspectives. If 
it can be demonstrated that the terms of cooperation are fair, then it would be logical 
to conclude that the legislation achieves a fair balance between the competing claims. 
 
Rawls defines fair cooperation where the  
terms that each participant may reasonably accept, provided that 
everyone else likewise accepts them. Fair terms of cooperation specify 
an idea of reciprocity or mutuality: all who are engaged in cooperation 
and who do their part as the rules and procedures require, are to benefit 
in some appropriate way as assessed by a suitable benchmark of 
comparison.’ (Rawls 1985, p.232) 
 
Hence fair cooperation assumes three main characteristics: 
 it is guided by commonly recognised rules and regulations 
 it is based on fair terms 
 it ought to be to each participant’s rational advantage. 
 
To resolve the tension between social utility and distributive justice, the competing 
principles ought to be viewed within their historical context. The process through 
which the scheme was conceived and evolved is another aspect to be considered in 
assessment of fairness of the terms of cooperation. Rawls’ notion of the multi-staged 
unfolding of justice suggests that the legal regime resulting from the collective 
decision making reflects the society’s values. 
 
Rawls sets out a three-step process that ensures acceptability of the resulting regime 
to society (Rawls 1985). In application to the treatment injury legislation this process 
could be described as following:  
1. the principles of justice were aligned with the societal values as they were 
based on the recommendations of the Woodhouse Report that identified 
injustice with redressing injuries arising from accidents; 
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2. the law reform and a replacement of common law by the no-fault regime 
followed the selected principles of justice at a ‘constitutional stage’ 
subsequent to the Woodhouse Report; 
3. the statute evolved from medical accidents to the treatment injury provisions, 
making cover provisions more inclusive, fair and aligned with the no-fault 
accident compensation scheme. 
 
Applying this model to the treatment injury regime, it appears that in its current form 
the legislation has been through a robust process of determining its scope, and it 
reflects the values of solidarity and community responsibility prevalent in New 
Zealand society.  
 
In an ideal world justice and fairness would favour extending benefits of the accident 
compensation scheme to sickness and ill-health. In reality, we evaluate one possible 
set of legal rules against another possible approach, and not against utopian 
arrangements. To quote Sen, ‘pursuing justice is about making comparisons’ (Sen 
2009, p.IX).   
 
The advantages of the no-fault scheme over tort law have been widely recognised. It 
is universally acknowledged that ‘the purpose of tort law is not to protect but to 
compensate.’ (Miola 2011, p.49).  By contrast, the no-fault social insurance is set out 
to accommodate both protection and compensation. The advantages and tangible 
benefits of the no-fault regime can be grouped into three categories. Most of these 
benefits have been discussed in the previous chapter, but it is helpful to summarise the 
key points. 
 
First, the treatment injury regime advances justice through consistency of resolution 
and efficiency of the accident compensation scheme administrative system. The 
former is accomplished through achieving equal results in similar cases and avoiding 
arbitrary and disparate redresses (Bovbjerg and Sloan 1998). The latter is achieved 
through more material benefits gained in relation to insurance premiums. 
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Second, the no-fault regime advances beneficence and non-maleficence as it 
facilitates improvements in patient safety and promotion of better quality of medical 
care through:  
 supporting centralised collection of data on adverse medical events, which is 
helpful in identifying trends and patterns and in its contribution towards 
developing strategies for preventing further medical injuries; 
 enabling reporting of risk of harm to the public to appropriate professional 
bodies. The reporting facilitates actions that can result in preventing further 
harm from occurring; 
 encouraging faster rehabilitation because there is no incentive for injured 
patients’ malingering while waiting for a court hearing; 
 not providing incentives to health professionals to practice defensive 
medicine. 
 
Third, the no-fault approach advances both justice and beneficence through efficient 
and fair compensation and rehabilitation:  
 direct access to the scheme expedites access to treatment, rehabilitation and 
compensation; 
 more people are eligible for cover because it does not require treatment to be 
erroneous. A majority of adverse events in healthcare are not caused by 
negligent or substandard treatment;  
 patients are more willing to make a claim when it is a means of accessing 
compensation and rehabilitation rather than retribution;  
 for the same reason health practitioners are more willing to support patients 
with making claims and be forthcoming about the circumstances and nature of 
injury. 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter utility beneficence requires balancing benefits 
and costs so to produce the best possible results. It seems that the treatment injury 
regime has achieved a reasonable balance of benefits and costs without infringing any 
of the key ethical propositions, and as a result has advanced utility beneficence. 
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The utilitarian and justice as fairness theories are distinct, yet their concepts and ideas 
are intertwined. While they may disagree on the means, in this context both theories 
seem to agree on the ends. Both theories agree that the terms of cooperation under 
which the scheme is set up are fair. Utilitarians appreciate the regime’s overall utility: 
greater good for the greater number. Justice as fairness conceded that while the 
scheme brings about some material inequalities, such inequalities are permissible 
because the terms of cooperation are fair and the scheme is to everybody’s rational 
advantage. 
 
Reiterating previously made points, some inequalities are not unjust and if terms of 
cooperation are fair individual expectations should be adjusted accordingly.  ‘Society 
is responsible for distributing the primary social goods in accordance with the 
principles of justice and individuals must adjust their conceptions of the good 
accordingly. If they are disappointed but the terms of cooperation are fair, that is too 




To recapitulate the main points of this dissertation, I have attempted to examine 
critically the ethical premises laid in the foundation of the treatment injury provisions 
of the accident compensation statute. Within the narrow scope of this research it is 
likely that I have not grappled adequately with all concerns. 
 
Justice and fairness, beneficence and non-maleficence were identified as the key 
ethical premises underlying the no-fault compensation regime. In contrast to tort law, 
the regime appears to have advanced justice and fairness, and have supported 
promotion of beneficence and non-maleficence. However, I concluded that the tension 
between social utility of the scheme and distributive justice remained unresolved and 
warranted in-depth analysis. 
 
I applied two major theories of distributive justice, utilitarianism and egalitarianism, 
to examine this tension.  Egalitarian implications for treatment injury legislation are 
that each member of society has access to an adequate level of compensation and 
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rehabilitation contingent on available resources. Using causation as a distributive 
criterion does not violate the principle of fairness as equality because all persons are 
treated as moral equals, and the same event activates a response that shifts resources 
among contributors and recipients in agreement with this criterion. Justice-based 
goals of universal access to all benefits would have made the system inefficient and 
unsustainable, and hence unfair. The scheme provides a reasonable trade-off between 
equality and efficiency.  
 
Both theories of distributive justice deployed in this analysis seem to agree on the 
view that some inequalities are permissible, though they come to this conclusion 
through different pathways. Utilitarians accept inequalities as long as these 
inequalities lead to increased total utility; egalitarians accept inequalities if they 
benefit those who are worse off. While not ideal, the treatment injury legislation 
appears to be ethically robust from the perspectives of both theories. To quote Rawls, 
the legislation has achieved ‘a proper balance between competing claims’ (Rawls 
1971, p.5). 
 
In the discourse on the connection between morality and law Hart holds that society 
creates legal rules that reflect accepted social morality prevailing in that society (Hart 
1961).  The intent and spirit of the accident compensation scheme seem to have 
corroborated this view as it mirrors the values prevalent in New Zealand society. Had 
John and Mary to chose a legal regime ‘behind a veil of ignorance’, it is likely that 
they would have chosen an administrative no-fault scheme rather than medical 
negligence law.   
 
All factors considered, the best liability regime for iatrogenic injuries depends on the 
interplay of concerns for fairness with pragmatic considerations. I conclude that the 
no-fault regime for medical injuries replaced the ethics of individual rights under tort 
law with the balanced ethics of common good and fairness. It is what was agreed on 
collectively under the fair terms of cooperation.  The scheme has achieved a just 
balance between competing interests and developed the legal regime that is to 
everybody’s rational advantage. The resulting social and economic gains are a 
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